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NOTES
TRUSTEE'S POWER TO DELEGATE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
I. Introduction
The traditional view of the courts in both England and America was that
a trustee could not rid himself of his obligation as trustee by delegating his au-
thority to another.' This hostility to the delegation of power by trustees was
based on the assumption that a settlor chose a trustee because of his confidence
in the personal judgment of the trustee.2
Individual and corporate trustees are still chosen for the abilities they possess.
However, it is doubtful whether any party to a trust is significantly benefitted by
a strict rule requiring personal performance of all duties necessary to the adminis-
tration of the trust.
As early as 1925, the need to broaden trustees' power to delegate was
recognized in the United Kingdom when the Trustee Act of 19253 was enacted.
This statutory codification expanded trustees' powers far beyond the confines
of the common law and permitted more flexibility in the administration of trusts.
In contrast, most American jurisdictions determine trustees' power to dele-
gate in reference to the applicable common law principles. Only a few states
have legislation dealing with the power of a trustee to delegate his authority or
employ agents.' Thus, the trustee is bound by the common law rule requiring
personal performance of trust duties unless the settlor expressly or impliedly
expands his powers of delegation.'
The model American statute, the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act6 (UTPA)
follows the English law on this subject and confers broad powers upon trustees.
The UTPA would give a trustee power
... to employ persons, including attorneys, investment advisors, or agents,
even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in
the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independent
investigation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting personally,
to employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether
or not discretionary (emphasis added) .7
1 This rule was expressed in the maxim "delegatus non potest delegare," meaninq that
a delegate cannot delegate; an agent cannot delegate his function to a subagent without
the knowledge or consent of the principal. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 513 (4th ed. 1968).
2 H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLAssn'mD AND ILLUSTRAIED 570
(10th ed. 1939).
3 Trustee Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c.19; [hereinafter cited as Trustee Act].
4 On power to delegate, see PA. PROBATE, ESTATES AND FImUcRrns CODE, tit. 20, §
3319 (Supp. 1972) (permits one fiduciary to delegate to another the right to exercise stock
subscription rights) and § 7133. Most states also have statutes dealing with power of fi-
duciaries in war service to delegate. Concerning power to employ agents, see IOWA PROBATE
CODE, ch. 633, §§ 84-86 '(1964) (permits employment of specialists).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1959).
6 UNIFoRM TRUSTEES' PowERs ACT, in THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1964 HANDBoOK, 267 [hereinafter cited as U.T.P.A.].
7 U.T.P.A. § 3(c)(24).
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This note will compare current English and American law with the pro-
visions of the UTPA. Particular attention will be given to five specific areas:
(1) delegation of the entire trust administration, (2) delegation to a cotrustee,
(3) power to cooperate with others, (4) use of expert advice, and (5) delegation
by a corporate trustee.
II. English Law
The old English rule of equity severely restricted the right of trustees to
delegate their powers or employ agents. The trustee was liable to the beneficiary
for the default of any agent he employed, regardless of the circumstances in-
volved. Thus, as Lord Langdale wrote in Turner v. Corney:8
... trustees who take on themselves the management of trust property for
the benefit of others have no right to shift their duty on other persons; and
if they employ an agent, they remain subject to the responsibility toward
the cestuis que trust, for whom they have undertaken the duty.9
At an early date, it was recognized that severe restriction of trustees' power
to delegate hindered effective trust administration. Consequently, the English
courts began permitting delegation where there was a legal necessity or where
the delegation accorded with the common usage of mankind, a circumstance
referred to as "moral necessity." Thus in Ex parte Belchier,'° a trustee in bank-
ruptcy employed a broker to sell the bankrupt's tobacco. Before presenting the
proceeds to the trustee, the broker went bankrupt. The court held that the
trustee was not liable for the default of the broker, stating that "where trustees
act by other hands, either from necessity, or conformable to the common usage
of mankind, they are not answerable for their losses."'"
The necessity rule of Beichier was followed for many years by the English
courts of equity and was confirmed by the House of Lords in the leading case
of Speight v. Gaunt." However, in upholding this rule, the court used language
which inadvertently became the basis for a new standard in the area of dele-
gation.
In Speight, a trustee had employed a broker to purchase securities author-
ized by the trust; a loss of funds resulted. While the court warned that a trustee
could not delegate his duties at "mere will and pleasure,"' 3 it held that the
trustee was not liable for the loss since employment of a stockbroker was a dele-
gation which would be made by an ordinary man of business in conducting his
own affairs. In time, the "ordinary man of business" became the "prudent man"
of the new test.
It was initially unclear, however, whether the standard of Speight was
simply a restatement of the old tests of legal necessity and common usage or a
8 49 Eng. Rep. 677 (1841).
9 Id. at 678.
10 27 Eng. Rep. 144 (1754).
11 Id. at 145.
12 [1884] 9 App. Cas. 1.
13 Id. at 5.
[December 1974]
[Vol. 50:273]
liberalization of those tests. The Lord Chancellor expressed the view that the
"necessity" requirement was still applicable."4 Lord Fitzgerald, however, stated
that the trustee was entitled to employ a broker even if he could have obtained
the securities without a broker.' Generally, the Lord Chancellor's restrictive
construction of the standard prevailed.
Thus, an agent could not be employed to undertake duties which a trustee
could easily perform himself."' Agents must be employed to perform services
within their area of specialization ' and they must be closely supervised by the
trustee. 8 A prudent man would personally hire any agents he employed. 9 Cer-




The trustee was forbidden to delegate his power under any circumstances
when a judgment to be made involved a purely personal decision. Thus, the
appointment of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust remained nondele-
gable.
21
Nevertheless, while the "ordinary man of business" was generally defined
in terms of the old necessity rule, a subtle shift in emphasis was occurring. De-
cisions written after the 1884 Speight opinion premise their holdings on prudent
conduct of the trustee rather than the strict necessity of his action. These deci-
sions laid the foundation for a clear break with the old tests of legal necessity and
common usage, which had lingered on with diminished importance.
The English Trustee Act of 1925 dealt the deathblow to the "necessity"
rule and revolutionized the position of the English trustee.2 Section 23(1) of
the Act reads as follows:
Trustees or personal representatives may, instead of acting personally, em-
ploy and pay an agent, whether a solicitor, banker, stockbroker, or other
person, to transact any business or any act required to be transacted or
done in the execution of the trust (emphasis added) .23
Thus, the Trustee Act codified a greatly liberalized "ordinary man of business"
standard called the "prudent man."
Under this liberalized rule, the Trustee Act provides that the trustee shall
not be responsible for the default of an agent employed in good faith.24 The
first case to apply this section of the act was In re Vickery.25 In that case, the
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id. at 29.
16 Re Brier, [1884] 26 Ch. D. 238.
17 Fry v. Tapson, [1885] 28 Oh. D. 268 (employing a lawyer as a rental agent).
18 Rowland v. Witherden, 42 Eng. Rep. 379 (1851); Bostock v. Floyer, 55 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1865).
19 In re Weall, [1889] 42 Ch. D. 674.
20 Wyman v. Paterson, [1900] App. Gas. 271, 280 (H.L.).
21 In re Boulton's Settlement Trusts, [1928] Ch. 703. See also Attorney-General v. Scott,
27 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1750).
22 See In re Vickery, [1931] 1 Ch. 572. "He [trustee] is no longer required to do any
actual work himself, but he may employ a solicitor or other agent to do it, whether there is any
real necessity for the employment or not." Id. at 581.
23 Trustee Act § 23 (1).
24 Id.
25 [1931] 1 Ch. 572.
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trustee employed a solicitor who had, unknown to the trustee, been suspended
from practice at one time. The beneficiaries of the trust finally told the trustee
of the solicitor's past improprieties and urged him to employ a different solicitor.
The solicitor, however, repeatedly assured the trustee that the matter would be
quickly completed. The trustee reasonably relied on such assurances and the
solicitor succeeded in stealing a substantial portion of the trust corpus.
The Chancery Division found the trustee was not liable and held that §
23(1) authorized the defendant to allow the solicitor to collect and retain the
trust funds involved. The court concluded that a trustee would be liable under
the Trustee Act only for a loss occurring through the trustee's own "wilful
default. '26 The latter term was defined as "consciousness of negligence or breach
of duty or a recklessness in the performance of a duty."27 An error in judgment,
such as that of the trustee in Vickery, was not considered a wilful default.
The court's definition of "wilful default" has provoked substantial criti-
cism.2" Most commentators argue that "want of reasonable care" should be in-
cluded in the definition.29 Thus, a trustee should not, by the honest appointment
of an agent, be free to ignore with complacency the activities of his agent."0
The later case of In re Lucking's Will Trusts2 ' substantiates this view. In
that case, trustees were charged with the loss resulting from negligence in super-
vising a manager whom they had employed. Citing Vickery, the defendants
argued that they were liable for the loss only if their negligence amounted to
"wilful default." The court, however, distinguished Vickery 2 and held that a
trustee must exercise the care of a reasonable man in overseeing the adminis-
tration of the trust even where he has appointed a competent agent.
III. American Law
Early American cases state that trustees could delegate their authority only
when required by strict necessity."3 A distinction was made, however, between
the discretionary duties which the trustee had been selected to perform and duties
26 Id. at 582. Section 30 states: "A trustee shall be chargeable only for money and
securities actually received by him notwithstanding his signing any receipt for the sake of
conformity, and shall be answerable and accountable only for his own acts, receipts, neglects or
defaults, and not for those of any other trustee, nor for any banker, broker, or other person with
whom any trust money or securities may be deposited, nor for any other loss, unless same
happens through his own wilful default." The incorporation of this clause in the predecessors
of the Trustee Act of 1925 only had the effect of changing the burden of proof. See R.
MAUDSLEY, HANBURY'S MODERN EQun'X 351 (9th ed. 1969) and Re Brier, [1884] 26 Ch. D.
238.
27 Id. at 584.
28 G. KEETON, LAW OF TRUSTS 257 (7th ed. 1957) (opinion that the reasoning of the
court is erroneous); LEWiN ON TRuSTS 135 (15th ed. R. Cozen, H. Home 1950) (accepted
view cautiously); R. MAUDSLEY, HANBURY'S MODERN EQUITY 228-9 (9th ed. 1969) (accepts
the case subject to an important limitation).
29 See excellent article, Jones, Delegation by Trustees: A Reappraisal, 22 MOD. L. REv.
381 (1959).
30 Id. at 389. To accept this view would be to depart dramatically from the standard
of the "reasonable man" and to protect the trustee if he is, in Holdsworth's phrase, an
"honest fool."
31 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 866.
32 Id. at 874 (securities were not involved in this case).
33 Keim v. Lindley, 31 A. 1063, 1074 (N.J. 1895); McMurtrie v. Pennsylvania 'Co., 9
Phila. 529 (Pa. 1872).
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which were merely ministerial or necessary to execute the trustees' discretion.
A similar distinction also appeared in early English law but it was relegated
to a minor status when the standard of reasonableness subtly replaced the
narrow tests based upon necessity. American courts, in contrast, stressed the
distinction between discretionary and ministerial.
Generally, American courts first determine whether a duty involves dis-
cretion, or as the Restatement of Trusts (2nd) expresses it, whether it is an
act "which the trustees can reasonably be required personally to perform. 134
Such a determination is made by considering, inter alia, the five factors listed
by the Restatement: (1) the amount of discretion involved; (2) the value
and character of property involved, (3) whether the property is principal or
income, (4) the proximity or remoteness of the subject matter of the trust, and
(5) the character of the act as one involving professional skill or facilities
possessed or not possessed by the trustee himself. 5
The most important factor unquestionably is the first, the amount of dis-
cretion involved. However, strong reliance on this factor alone is fraught
with difficulty. Almost every act involves a certain amount of discretion and
this does not necessarily make delegation of the act improper.3 " Nevertheless,
if the court finds that the delegated duty is not discretionary, the trustee cannot
be liable for improper delegation." If, however, the court determines that the
duty involved discretion, the trustee may be liable for any default of the agent,
even if he has acted prudently." It is clear that under English law, a trustee
would not be liable for improper delegation in the latter circumstance. The
delegation of discretion alone is not a breach of trust.
IV. Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act4 is similar to the English Trustee Act
of 1925 in conferring broad powers of delegation upon trustees. The UTPA
places greater reliance upon the trustees' self-regulation and codifies the "prudent
man" standard. 1 It does not relieve the trustee of his duty to use judgment
in administering the trust. 2 Clearly, agents employed by the trustee can only
"assist and advise." In addition, the TPA specifically states that the entire
administration of the trust cannot be delegated.4s
In one significant area, however, the UTPA does relieve the trustee of his
34 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
35 Id. comment d at 374.
36 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW Or TRUSTS § 171.2 (3rd ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
SCOTT].
37 Id.
38 There is some confusion over the proper terminology to be used in such a situation.
Some courts state that a ministerial duty may be delegated. See McLean v. Peyser, 169 Md. 1,
179 A. 58 (1935). Other courts say that allowing others to perform ministerial duties is not
a true delegation at all. See Beacon Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Stadler, 95 Ohio App. 441, 120
N.E.2d 743 (1954). It seems that the former view is the correct one.
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 225(2) (1959).
40 UNIFORM TRusTEEs' PowERs ACT (1964).
41 THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW.S, 1964
HANDBOOK, 265.




duty to use judgment. Section 24(c) (15) provides that the trustee may act on
the agent's recommendations without independent investigation. 44 It is extremely
doubtful whether English law would deem such conduct to be prudent, where
information obtained from the agent merited further inquiry by the trustee.
45
The English law governing delegation of a trustee's powers distinguishes
the overall judgment which a trustee is bound to use in administering a trust
from the discretion necessary to carry out specific tasks of trust administration.
The trustee may delegate the exercise of the judgment required to perform
certain tasks but may never delegate his personal responsibility to oversee the
administration of the trust. The exercise of discretion by the trustee in making
prudent delegations allows him to be more flexible and, perhaps pragmatic, in
furthering the goals of the trust than under a more restrictive view.
American law, in contrast, limits the range of opportunity for delegation
which has been granted by the English law. The modem American view con-
dones a personal exercise of the trustee's judgment in all matters of trust adminis-
tration involving any amount of discretion. While clinging to the basic assump-
tion of the common law that a trustee is chosen because of the settlor's confidence
in his judgment,4 6 the American rule fails to recognize that in many cases, good
judgment demands prudent delegation.
The strict rule against delegation assumes that an agent will err when the
trustee would not. Yet, in this age of complex trusts, the contrary is more likely
to be true. The rule, by forcing a trustee to limit his own judgment in regard
to delegation, may lead him to act in a way that a reasonable man, pursuing
his own interest, would not. While a few American cases have judged the
legality of delegation by the "prudent man" standard,4 7 most American courts
continue to follow the Restatement view.
48
V. Specific Problems
A. Complete Delegation of Trust Administration
The delegation of the entire administration is clearly forbidden by American
common law49 and the UTPA.5 It is also forbidden under English law,"' sub-
ject to two specific exceptions, both of which are based upon the difficulties of
administering a trust from a distance.
The first exception allows the trustee to appoint any person to exercise a dis-
cretion or power vested in the trustee in relation to any property in trust outside
44 Id. at § 3(c)(24).
45 Whiteley v. Learoyd [1886] 33 ,Oh. D. 347.
46 Thus, "a trust or discretion in the agent for the exercise of which he is selected
cannot be delegated to another," H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND
ILLUSTRATED 570 (10th ed. 1939) and agency as "a personal trust and confidence which
cannot be delegated." 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 825 (8th ed. 1854).
47 See note 39, supra.
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171, comment g (1959).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171, comment c (1959).
50 See note 42, supra.
51 Green v. Whitehead t1930] 1 Ch. 38, 45.
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the United Kingdoma In so providing, § 23 (2) of the Trustee Act is merely
a codification of the common law rule.53 While the trustee acting under § 23 (2)
is not liable only by virtue of having made such an appointment, he is liable if
he does not delegate his responsibility reasonably and prudently.
The second exception to the restriction against delegation of the entire
administration is found in § 25 (1) of the Trustee Act. This section allows a
trustee to delegate to another (donee) the entire administration of the trust
during his (trustee-donor) absence abroad for a period not exceeding twelve
months.5 4 A specific procedure to effectuate the delegation is provided by
statute.5 Under § 25(1), the individual or trust corporation to whom the
power of administration is delegated has all the powers of the donor except the
power to delegate. 6 Despite a valid delegation under § 25 (1), the trustee-donor
remains liable for the acts or defaults of the agent as if they were his own acts
or defaults.57 Thus, although both § 25(1) and § 23(2) of the Trustee Act
make exceptions to the usual policy by allowing a complete delegation, the
exception given in § 25(1) is relatively restricted. Under the latter provision,
the delegation is limited to one year. In addition, the trustee is not protected
by his own initial exercise of prudence.
This distinction between delegation of the authority to manage a trust
when the res is abroad and the delegation of authority to manage a trust while
the trustee is abroad is reasonable and reflects the probable difference in the
settlor's expectations. When distant property forms part of the trust corpus,
the settlor, arguably, must have known of the practical difficulties inherent in
appointing a local trustee. Consent to such a delegation may be implied from
the settlor's knowledge at the time of the appointment. Thus, a broad power to
delegate comports with the common law philosophy of compliance with the
settlor's intent.
A restricted power of delegation when a trustee goes abroad is also consistent
with the earlier common law view. It is unlikely that a settlor appoints a trustee
with the expectation that he will leave the country and delegate the adminis-
52 Trustee Act § 23(2) "Trustees or personal representatives may appoint any person to
act as their agent or attorney for the purpose of selling, converting, collecting, getting in and
executing and perfecting insurances of, or managing or cultivating, or otherwise administering
any property, real or personal, moveable or immoveable, subject to the trust or forming part of
the testator's or intestate's estate, in any place outside the United Kingdom or executing or
exercising any discretion or trust or power vested in them in relation to any such property
such ancillary powers, and with and subject to such provisions and restrictions as they may
think fit, including a power to appoint substitutes, and shall not, by reason only of their
having made such appointment, be responsible for any loss arising thereby."
53 Stuart v. Norton, 15 Eng. Rep. 212 (1860) (trustees allowed to appoint an attorney to
represent trustee in all rights and actions in colony of British Guinea and management of a
plantation).
54 Trustee Act § 25(1) "Notwithstanding any rule of law or equity to the contrary, a
trustee may, by power of attorney, delegate for a period not exceeding twelve months the
execution or exercise of all or any of the trusts, powers and discretions vested in, him as
trustee either alone or jointly with any other person or persons." (The original formulation
of this provision allowed the trustee to delegate trust administration if he was going to be
absent from the United Kingdom for a period of more than one month.) Under this power, a
trustee may not delegate to his only other cotrustee, unless such cotrustee is a trust corpora-
tion. Trustee Act § 25(2).
55 Trustee Act § 25(3) and § 25(4). See also Practice Dir. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 355.
56 Trustee Act § 25(6).
57 Trustee Act § 25(5).
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tration of the trust to someone else. Since this eventuality is further from the
settlor's intent than is the action contemplated under § 23 (2), it is not surprising
that it is more severely circumscribed.
Under prevailing American law, it would be a breach of trust for an
American trustee to delegate his power in those exceptional circumstances in
the Trustee Act."5 Giving the trustee power to delegate his discretion, even for
a short period, would be contrary to the common law view. No matter how
exigent the circumstances, a complete delegation would be a delegation of dis-
cretion and hence impermissible.
Whether the UTPA would allow such a delegation is, as yet, unlitigated.
Under the general provisions of the UTPA, the trustee would probably be able
to delegate his discretion in these situations. However, such delegations may be
construed as conflicting with § 4 of the UTPA which forbids in express terms
the delegation of the entire administration of the trust."
B. Delegation to a Cotrustee
Under any statement of the law, a trustee may not commit the administration
of the entire trust to his cotrustee.6 Each cotrustee has a duty to participate
in the administration of the trust." Nevertheless, a trustee may delegate the
doing of particular acts to a cotrustee on the same bases as he would delegate
to an agent.
The English courts permit the delegation of authority to a cotrustee sub-
ject to the same qualifications which would be applicable in delegating to any
other agent. Thus, in Carruthers v. Carruthers,2 the court stated that the
trustees could have made the appointment of one of their number as factor
even if the trust instrument had not given them this power.
6 3
In the United States, trustees may not delegate to their cotrustees duties
involving the exercise of discretion and judgment.64 The characterization of
the act as ministerial or discretionary is critical. Ministerial acts are delegable
since the practicalities of trust administration demand that trustees should not
have to "parade out together to act on details. 61 5 If, however, one trustee does
alone exercise the discretion of the trusteeship, his cotrustees may be estopped
by their own conduct from repudiating the action taken.6 6 Such a transaction
may be upheld on principles of equity.67
58 See Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304 (1874); SCOTT § 171.1.
59 U.T.P.A. § 4.
60 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 171, comment c (1959); U.T.P.A. § 4; Crewe
v. Dicken, 31 Eng. Rep. 50 (1798).
61 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 184, comment a (1959).
62 [1896] A.C. 659.
63 Id. at 663.
64 Allison & VerValen Co., Inc. v. McNee, 170 Misc. 144, 9 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct.
1939); In re Campbell's Estate, 171 Misc. 750, 13 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sur. Ct. 1939); Herr v.
U.S. Casualty Co., 347 Pa. 148, 31 A.2d 533 (1943).
65 Landow v. Keane, 10 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also, i n re Kohler's Estate,
348 Pa. 55, 33 A.2d 920 '(1943).
66 Blum v. William Goldman Theatres, 164 F.2d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1946); Deviney v.
Lynch, 372 Pa. 570, 94 A.2d 578 (1953).
67 Deviney v. Lynch, 372 Pa. 570, 94 A.2d 578 (1953).
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The UTFA approximates the English rule. A trustee is permitted to dele-
gate authority to his cotrustee if a prudent man would so delegate. However,
here again, the trustee would be empowered to act on his cotrustee's advice
without independent assessment of its validity.
C. Power to Cooperate with Others
The English Trustee Act specifically provides for a power to cooperate
with others.6" Under this section, persons owning stock in a certain corporation,
including a trustee, could join together to pursue, for example, a stockholder's
derivative suit. While the trustee is delegating his discretion in this instance,
he is allowed to do so because of the overriding benefit accruing to the trust by
taking such an action.
In similar fashion, the American common law generally gives trustees the
power to cooperate with others in ventures beneficial to the trust estate. 69 One
of the early cases upholding this power to cooperate was In re Rees' Estate.
70
In that case, some trustees had invested in a mutual fund. This action was chal-
lenged as being an improper delegation by the trustees because the management
of the mutual fund could independently make important investment decisions.
Although the trustees in this instance had obviously delegated their dis-
cretion, the court upheld the investment. In doing so, the court did not dwell
upon the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties. Rather, it
focused upon what it found to be the intention of modem trust law, placing upon
the trustee the responsibility of prudent behavior. The investment in a reputable
management enterprise was not an abandonment of trustees' duties in any real
sense but rather a discharge of them."'
The UTPA does not mention a general power to cooperate with others,
as does the English statute. However, there is an implied power to cooperate.
Section 3 (c) (15) of the UTPA gives the trustee power
... to sell or exercise stock subscriptions or conversion rights; to consent
directly or through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consoli-
dation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or other business
enterprise.
72
This section specifically approves most of the actions which would be taken
68 Trustee Act § 24. "Where an undivided share in the proceeds of the sale of land
directed to be sold, or in any other property, is subject to a trust, or forms part of the estate
of a testator or intestate, the trustees or personal representatives may (without prejudice to the
trust for sale affecting the entiret of the land and the power of the trustees for sale in
reference thereto) execute or exercise any trust or power vested in them in relation to such
share in conjunction with the persons entitled to or having power in that behalf over the
other share or shares, and notwithstanding that any one or more of the trustees or personal
representatives may be entitled to or interested in any such other share, either in his or their
own right or in a fiduciary capacity." See also Trustee Act § 10(3) involving corporate
securities; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 20 §§ 23-29.
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 171, comment i (1959). See also ScoTr §
171.3.
70 41 Ohio Op. 61, 87 N.E.2d 397 (1947), aff'd, 53 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 85 N.E.2d 563
(1949). But see In re Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
71 In re Rees' Estate, 41 Ohio Op. 61, 87 N.E.2d 397 (1947).
72 U.T.P.A. § 3(c) (15).
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under a general power to cooperate with others. Actions not specifically men-
tioned which would involve trustee's surrender of his discretion in cooperating
with others, could be implied. The specific powers enumerated in the UTPA
are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 3
D. Use of Expert Advice
The general rule in both England and the United States is that the trustee
may consult an expert. He is still required, however, to use independent judg-
ment in evaluating and using advice tendered by the expert. 4
The UTPA provides that when experts are employed to advise or assist
a trustee, the trustee is empowered "to act without independent investigation
upon their recommendations." 5 This section of the UTPA departs radically
from both English and American law. Consequently, it has been severely criti-
cized as an unjustified extension of trustee's power to delegate his judgment
and discretion."
E. Delegation by a Corporate Trustee
The rules governing delegation of trustees' powers will have their greatest
impact in their application to corporate trustees."
English law has generally held the paid trustee to the standard of a prudent
man with special skills. In National Trustees of Australasia, Ltd. v. General
Finance Co. of Australasia," the Appeals Court found it material that the
trustee was in the business of trusteeship and that he was paid for the exercise
of special skill. 9 In a later case, the court held that a "bank which advertises
itself largely in the public Press as taking charge of administration is under a
special duty."8 " Finally, in Re Rosenthal,"1 a corporate trustee was held liable
for a breach of trust whereas an individual trustee was exonerated. The court
based its decision on the fact that "although the [corporate] trustee had acted
honestly, as a professional trustee he had not.., acted reasonably." '
In the United States, at least one court has stated that the rule against
73 Id. at § 3(a).
74 Attorney-General v. Olsen, 346 Mass. 190, 190 N.E.2d 132, 136 (1963); Whiteley v.
Learoyd, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 347.
75 U.T.P.A. § 3(c)(24).
76 See Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Principles of Fiduciary
Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. RPv. 801, 831-35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hallgring];
Haskell, Some Problems with the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 32 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 168, 175-78 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]. While it is clear that the trustee must
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delegation is not applicable to corporate trustees. The element of reliance on
the personal judgment and discretion of the trustee is absent in such a case.
Additionally, a corporate trustee can only act through its officers and directors
and these may change from time to time. 4
The general principles of agency support this position, as far as the per-
formance of trust administration through the employees and officers of the cor-
porate entity is concerned. Hence, there is no question of improper delegation
where a corporate trustee acts through its proper officers and employees."8
However, necessary discretion should be exercised by the board of directors or
a responsible committee or officer." It would clearly be a breach of trust to
allow an employee with no visible authority to speak for the corporate entity
in such a matter."
Aside from the question of intracorporate delegation, however, the rules
concerning delegation and employment of agents are applied in the same man-
ner to corporate trustees as they are to individual trustees. If the trustee dele-
gates his authority to another outside the corporate entity, he may be liable
for breach of trust.8 "
In practical terms, it is questionable whether the power of the corporate
trustee to employ agents is as great as that of an individual trustee. It is apparent
that a corporate trustee, in possession of greater knowledge and expertise than
most individual trustees, could reasonably be expected to perform on a higher
level than that of the reasonable man. This view has been adopted by some
American courts"0 as well as the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.9 '
An alternate theory of liability is that if the corporate trustee represents
to the public that it has and possesses a higher degree of skill and ability than
that of the individual, such a trustee will be held to that degree of skill, whether
or not it actually possesses it. 2 If this principle were applied in the area of
delegation, a corporate trustee could not delegate to others those functions in
which it claimed expertise. 3
This latter view stresses the representations of the corporate trustee to the
settlor. A corporate trustee would not be allowed to escape liability by acting as
a "prudent man" when it failed to exercise the competence it promised to the
settlor. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts has endorsed this theory of
liability.
9 4
The UTPA does not apply the higher standards of skill to corporate trustees
83 Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill. 31, 105 N.E. 718 (1914).
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as have some of the American courts and all of the English courts. Its terms
indiscriminately apply the standard of the man of "ordinary prudence, diligence,
discretion and judgment" to all trustees.95 Consequently, critics have voiced
fears that if the trustee's power to delegate is increased while skill is not used
in determining prudence, corporate trustees will be able to delude their potential
settlors as to the services they will receive.1
6
These fears would seem to be generally unfounded since principles develop-
ing in the common law, such as skill and liability based on representation of
ability, militate against such a result. However, from a jurisprudential view, it
would seem more beneficial to codify the relationship between skill and the
trustees' power to delegate and employ agents.
VI. Conclusion
The American view of trustees' power to delegate and employ agents is
inappropriate in view of the necessities of modem trust administration. The
emphasis on an imaginary line which divides ministerial duties from those in-
volving discretion detracts from what should be the central focus: the risk in-
volved weighed against the potential benefit to the trust.
The English approach is more sophisticated and more responsive to modern
needs. It emphasizes the substance of a trustee's function rather than its form.
Jurisprudentially, English law is more consistent and predictable in its application
of a readily identifiable standard: the "prudent man." In addition, English
law gives the trustee significantly more power "ex officio" than does American
law, with the result that resort to the judicial system in trust administration
is less frequent. It also provides rules to accommodate exceptional types of situ-
ations rather than trying to subsume all aspects of trust administration under
one rule.
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, in attempting to emulate the values
expressed in the English Trustee Act of 1925, has disregarded some of the protec-
tive features of the English act without a substantial benefit to effective trust
administration, to protection of the beneficiary's interests, or to fulfillment of
the settlor's purposes. This is especially true in those provisions allowing the
trustee to act on his agent's advice without independent investigation.
The UTPA could be improved immeasurably by adding to the definition
of the "prudent man" the following caveat: "If such trustee either has or has
represented himself to possess special skill, knowledge, or ability, he will be
required to use such ability in the administration of the trust." In addition,
the UTPA could be amended to circumvent the problem encountered under
the English Trustee Act in the case of In re Vickery. It should include "want
of reasonable care" in the definition of those acts or omissions which render
the trustee liable for breach of trust.
Elizabeth E. Baringhaus
95 U.T.P.A. § 1(3) defines a "prudent man" as follows: "a trustee whose exercise of
trust powers is reasonable and equitable in view of the interests of income or principal bene-
ficiaries, or both, and in view of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, diligence,
discretion and judgment would act in the management of their own affairs."
96 See note 76, supra, Haskell at 171 and Hallgring at 801.
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